The Soviet\u27s fight for disarmament: Containing speeches by Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
PRISM: Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements 
1-1-1932 
The Soviet's fight for disarmament: Containing speeches 
Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/prism 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in PRISM: Political 
& Rights Issues & Social Movements by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact 
STARS@ucf.edu. 
Recommended Citation 
Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich, "The Soviet's fight for disarmament: Containing speeches" (1932). PRISM: 
Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements. 347. 
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/prism/347 
ARMAMENT 
- 
''A ' FOR 
SOVIET'S FIGHT 
DISARMAMENT 
Con-g S w t s  by M. Lmvmov 
I - atatem,rggz,andotherdmments 
n in sequel to c' Th S&t Uftm md P- " with at1 Introduction 
by 
M. LUNACF~~I~SKY 
. . 
3 
m w  YORX 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLISERRS 
A -- 

I Note.-This boolr C Q n ~  supphenmy doctmmb 1 I Swict Unioa rmd Pme,  which, published in x-, d h  ~ u c t i o n  by IT& Barbusse, con& the mas b p ~  doamem and speeches of the Governmmt of the U.&& ~ ~ a n d ~ t f r o m  1gr7brrsag. by Martin Luwrmce Ltd., 7s. 66. (paper, 3s. 6d.)] - C .- --  
THE SOVIET'S FIGHT 
WTRODUCTION 
preparing for it through t h e  
in the &ations of d opinion 
F r o m t h e v e r g : ~ o n o f t h e L e a g u e o f N ~ f n r m *  
very beginning of tht talk of disarmamtxlt aa the c h i d e ,  
of the struggle for peace, during all the d a d  work in p d b  
f 
B u t ~ w i a h ~ s E a p t i c a l ~ o t h a r ~ ~ m b e  
hrd,fuUQ~mdaeLegncofNatiom,anddy,tahg 
t b e w h h f o r ~ ~ t o ~ t h e L q u e t o i n s u g u t a t e a g e n u i t w  
~ d t b l d n g d o m o f h u m a n i t g a n d t h e  nip o f h w  on 
earth. 
~ t 8 e @ d v o i c e s h m e g ~ l w n ~ r ~ y ~ g .  
T k ~ w h i c h b y n o ~ ~ d o p ~ o u r C o m m u n i s t p o i n t o f  
*, has of late months spoken hmMy of the 
h p e ,  its palitia, arnd ita pmepcts. A little while qp the ' 
~ n c w 8 p a ~ ~ t s O l ~ d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e L e g g u e o f  
M a t h s  was to all intents and pwpow d y  dead, that it had 
mmmbd euicide at the moment it demonstrated ita impotence 
a0 setrle the Sin+ Japanese a d i c t .  
Here, the impwtsrnt fact ie not the particular paper, but that 
1 3 
4 
i t ~ t b e v i e w s o f a c h o r u s o f n ~ u s v o i c e s .  r? -
fn d t y ,  w h  the h a p e  of Natba, despite its own essigna- 
~ , i ~ o w n ~ , m d a n n e d w i t h t h e g e l l o g g P a c t i n  
M m ,  not d y  proved impteat to stop the fizst really scrim * i 
war by its intmmtion, but even to all h t a t a  and putpogee 4 
Meseed that war, md b l d  it in mumally hypocritid forms, 
cpen tbe maat ptieot, the most 8 h o r t 4 ~ ,  could only sit 
brcbinammmmt. 
Hod ie beingpouradout in -,ammsm thundering, 
mdheguns  ratding, towns and railways a n  being attacked by 
1 
bombing-ph, enormow forcee of 80ldiCm m marching on 
-, an entire vast countrg is being conquered by ies neigh- 
bout, but the LRsgue con-, with a comidity which at first 
wt s e ~ ~  deprived of dl self-=pact, to decIart that 
h i s n o m .  
Aad truly, how can there be r war when there has been no 
d t c k a t h  of war ?-when none of the documents fondly 
~ t o t h e ~ t i o n o f t h c d t y o f t h b ~ e r d s t s ?  
T'heICelloggPactdoesnotcoverC=hiaa. Japsnie"odyduchg 
thcdmcadManchuriatoorder." J a p , a s s h e W d . k d y  1 
d d a d  hi reply to tk United States, has even received formal 
. . 
~ O f h e r ~ a c t i v i t i e s f r o m t h e L e a g u t o f N a t i o n s  
in tbt fwm of permhion to carry on operations against ban- 
And i€& the p- of 6ghting h& Japan also 6ghb the 
agular atmy of Mauchuria entidy am she widus, it is as ths 
&st, if the b g w  of Nations d y  hqims 
paople and driving humsnitg to 
amihibion, have not yet anddated one modm, 
thegd idnothsve the t scbn ica l~adqmht~  
I aowtbeyhavethem." 
E 
. - 'Jh *P- in*& 
k t a n d ~ w h o h a v a f d l o m d ~ t z i  
' 8 W d t h e r e P l ~ o b t h s ~ ~ , w ~ w i l l i s t l t t  
asciaive factor* 
W h a t i n ~ ~ t h h ~ o m ?  
F r o m & e w r y ~ t h e c h i e f o p p o n m t o f ~ t ,  
Le. Fraaca. nnd her direct semi-&, eet up an impamable 
W e r  d tke d b l e  purpose of the commhi~fl, dis- 
mnment, M a  b the q d o n  of " d q . "  "We 
csnaat d h m  so long aa we have not set up an order under which 
dA Seatecan d d e r  imlf fm of danger,'' Such waa thc tone 
mtabkhd at the very beginning of lab- of the Commkbn, 
and now, on the eve of the Conference on Dimmamerit, it has 
h v a e d  by, among others, the Rumanian U t e r  for 
F o d p  *M. Shyka. ' 
We have a group of people sittingI -one of whom hol& a 
loadadrevdverattheready inhishand,allafhidofonesu1othm, 
dl complainiag of their dbqmabte podion, and, aar d am 
eompIaining, the intelligent propad is made to throw away the 
mdwm and so dim tbemsdvts of their bmlcna. But thb 
proposal is mutered by anather pro* : to throw away the 
~ t ~ ) l w m ,  only provided an atmmpherc of u n i v d  trust and 
. . d B  is preliIxvnarily estabbhd 
By thia hpliiied example one can w how childishly un- 
d l t  b such a proposat. But it is unreasonable only p m  
vidd you accept the view that a genuine q d t y  of pdiw 
in thie company of armed men--ban& and ~ctims- 
&ng at onc another. In &ty here we haveL people mmc 
w d ,  mmt BtCong, some excellently, and some p l y ,  anned ; 
d o r a e a ~ u a d ~ t h a t f o r t b t s t r o n g , d h m n a m e n t b m  
.lllzwdcome busin-, b u a c  it will reduce the differact between 
thean and the others. And if to this be added the fact that war 
hdumk yield enormous p m b ,  if it be added that all the 
@brium established by the V d w  peace is a s d a U y  a 
-pbe h a  ofequilibrium, that causes of war arise at cvcry 
Ibcp, that the air is fall of the microbee of catastrophe, then tha 
of the enwplow and tense human wiUs of a profoundly 
&b k, which do not want disammat, becomes unda- 
'r&nh& 
But w& then, are &me p m c m  for ? What f the 
Nptiollil for ? Why art fbese m d h  commhionm with 
-. They are newmy, beamc tbe advocates of war, 
w g  Eor war, must neverthelm reckon with th - 
of&, sumred, but politi* of d d t m b i e  pbwtr, who 
h c e d v  d o u s  to avoid war and who mdd mwc mat " dcD' 
- (ti; of the U.S.S.R a t  wad k b & ~  much more con&&- 
As was known in a d m a ,  the delegation of tke U.S,S,R. t 4prevent thc mmmtful course of thia ceremony held for the 1 hd3oftheUtrusthg~uls." Butthemmthuningdwodd 
k~pted, for how epn thwebcdiar t if ao consi-h 
r W h had any mt whatever in it if the U,S*S.R had not par- 
3 k politid factor is abmt ? 
That in why the U.S.S.R was invited to send its delegation to 
dm Cmmdmioa, 
'The. U.S.SJL h k  and taka the gumtion of the 
&peace quite d o d y .  It d y  has no desire for war. That is 
baca~i twas in i t sessencem~eanor@sat ioa  The 
&.B,s.R with its ideology, the M d t - M t  outlook, m h  
p attempt to hide the fact thae it is a militant organidon, but - 1 
~ w k r ~ h i c h k o f i t a ~ ~ c e ~ o ~ f o r m a .  Itisthcwa~ I - 2 
-, w the mult of which toiling h 6 y  must shatter h 
a -
BiQB. T h e l x s t d t o p i c t o ~ i a t h i s w a r b t b e c n m m ~ g  
Bee -don which the meat w o r h '  Sate is dcvelopk . 
u ~ r t a l i ~ d ~ , m a k ~ ~ t h i a ~ o v u a m e n t t h e s o l e  
~~ mpprt and hope, 
The m e  8tep of the U,S.S.R. ma to put f o m d  such a 
L plan d &armament as would raise the question seriously, so 
tbat the d o t m e s s  with which the question w a ~ ~  miad m d d  
, . at ~ n o e  lay bare dl the deception of the stir that is rally going 
&under thc guise of prepamtion for dkmament. 
I. 
- The Union proposed that the Stat- should consider a p h  of 
genuine and decisive dbammmt. 
was turned down under a hail of sophisms and 
- L!T;dib"st Conmimion. 
It is impdble  to say that in doing so they attempted to expend 
any considerable quantity of intelligence and diplomacy. The 
sophisms which were burled against themSoviet propad were 
cxbemely frivolous. Before the end of the dku&011 the Swiet 
delegation could calmly say that they were intertsted in seeing that 
the whole mume of that discussion WEB brought in detail to the i ! 
attention of every objective and h o r n  man, for every aucb man 
would see the justice of the @tion of the U.S.S.R., the weight 
of its arguments and the artificial nature of the methods by means 1 
of which the Soviet propod was rejected. 
The strongest point of the criticism c a m  in the long spaech d 
the r e p r ~ a t i v e  of Great Britain, IArd Cushendun. At its 
condusian there was a kind of jubilation among the opponents af 
the Soviet proposal, eome triumphant clapping of the noble lord 
for his handling of the repmentativ~ of revolution. 
But this culminating point in the argument of our opponents 
wits transformed the very next day into an abyss into which they 
fell. We can with full confidence declare that comrade Litvinov's 
m w e r  to Cushendun was a complete triumph. Not one of the 
noble lord's arguments but was completely riddled. Not one of 
bir-staternab waa dowed to pass without an answering blow. 
This dud has by no means Imt ita historical impomce wen tot 
day, and it c till sheds adequate light on the position of both aid-. a A
But the workers' State had no intention of withdrawing its a 1 
*tion after its p r o p d  bad been turned down. Such a with- 3 
- I h w a J  would undoubtedly have -bled the other gmmmmts, - 7 
athearth&banylrindofdisanoament,tothrowdtheadium 
of on the U.S*S.R. I i 
pee of tbe world." 
T h e S o v i e t ~ t b a d n o ~ t o ~ ~ ~  
to arise. Comepatly its ddegstim put f d  a new 
for working out r n m  for " " 
t d y  safe md uselaas labours. Those Iabom in w, 
I the declaration of Fmce rmnd its d t e s  that no 
g m d i y  in order ta d i s ~  the attention of public 
s o t h e r e w e r e p ~ d e b a ~ i n t h e c o u m e o f w h i  
' docamentwhichisnowmse~~asthebahforthe 
Confemw Waa dmm up. 
genuine dbmament 
The Soviet delegation took active + in thie 
bemuse it hoped by dd imp-, 
' t h e d p u r p o r # o f ~ ~  
8 THE WWWS FIGHT FOR DlS- 11 
miseion to rmdcr the abortive k advanoe A d d  be 
d k t o B n .  
One session was d u d e d  by a speech from comrade Litvhov, 
inwhichheckdad: " B c f o r e t h e s e d o n b e p I e x p d t b e  
conviction that it muid not make s single mp fornard. I was 
r little midqm, the result was othemise: despite even my 
scepticinn, d o n  has mken quite a number of ate-but 1- 
bacaward I "  I 
That m, quite t n r W y ,  how the debates of the notorious 
Prepamtory Commission proceeded. One after mother eveq 
quuatim of any serious import was witbdrsrm. The gigantic war 
et& a the disposal of the various mhies, their armed w e s  
were left beyond the horizon of the future Conference. All " nomen- 
-" which might ~riously affect the in- techaicrrl 
preparations for war were a r e f d y  left outside its p d e w .  
But, pcrhape, after such an experience the U.S.S.R should ' 
have d u d  to take further part in the " dhmanent " comedy ? 
No, that it could not do. The chaham ofthe Soviet delegation, 
d e  Litvinw, frankly declared that nevertheless the d 
. labour might begin at the Conferme i d ,  whem the powers 
would be represented by their plenipotentiary delegations, the 
red directors of their policiw, and not, aa m the case in the 
majority of instances at the Commission, by wbordinate officiah. 
These powem will be present in pemn, so to speak, and will have 
to answer for their @tion to public opinion. There the pressure 
of that public opinion might h d  stronger and more red e x p d o n .  
T ' b k  is why, said Litvinav, there is hope in the greater si@cance 
in the discussion of the &armament problem at the Conference ' 
w. 
Thh d e c t i o n  of c o d e  Litvinov by no means i m p b  that 
- his scepticism has been replaced by faith. It is only a better 
laFgument that at the present moment of debatw on d' 
7 ;  I &e U.S,S.R. cannot abandon them, laving the reapomibility for 
.& biiure of the Conference to be thrown on Swiet R d  '1  
8 k  muat, on the contmry, firmly defend every prospect of db- 
.' .miWnatt and r u t  lay bare the more or 1- clever game of ita , 
o d m  not openly renounce the idea of d i m -  
quietly to burg it, whilst pretending that in d t g  
* .  
. * 
I 
I w m t h g h ~ h t h e ~ d s o f t h e s i ~ f ~ w h k h ~  
,paepolringfaritadoleseaofofering. 
The g e n d  situation ie extmnely ~ U X a b I e  to &at a 
I struggfe for pace which the U.S.S.R k carry& on. h l&q . 
F ' r a n c e i s t b t ~ c w n t r y i n E u r o p e .  Asbehm,&eL 
' amandad with a whole & o m  of d m ,  obeying her h i g i  
$lesture,asad-tmhdorchear~rrrobeyeastrictmductw~ &I8: 
before, ~ n ~ l r n d i a  unhdiqg in her" amc&maa' to ~reeop. 
The unykhhg Lard m c h t n  wan r e p l a d  by the h i b k L m .  
~ ~ ~ ~ d d l , b u t t h c ~ t i m b r n a b c m i n t b s ~ ~ ~ ,  
f e t b e d  C e e i l a h d m c c d t o F r a a c e ' a p i p e ~ w l i t h ~  
cnshmdun, the only di&llancs beingthat, * ~ o n s ~ l -  h 
position after an*, he has endeswud to p-e the Pitoae 6' 
d a " great paciht," and c m t i m d p ~ ~ ~ , ~ W  
b l e v e l o f h e r m a m a m m b :  anobvioudypamkbl 
demand. 
G e r m a n y h a s ~ ~ v e r y I i t t h i n t h b m a t t a t , ~ ' :  
m abe lam been during the work of the Conunbiw. And $ 
~ t i o n i t h b e m n o ~ t o a a y b o d y t b a t ~ r a a l ~ ~ ~  
sistsno~inocbersbebgdisarmeddowntoherownlevtl,~d&. 
*baa d e d  amdbly, but in herself being dowed to a m  I#
totbeirkd. 151 
Of tima M c a ,  irriwted by thc 
d t b t s ~ ~ d h g t o h e r , h I x m  
seriously of prodligacp, and h i t  and foremost 
amamatn. But Ameria's doqueme* 
r n i l l g i v e a ~ ~ e t o t h e w l d ~ o f t h  
~ , c a n h a r d l y t r e * ~ y w h s n  
F- - 
. , -- 
- h 
a E o i d  fleet, her chid, 
her land forcw can 
are divided into the mmditid m d a  
the compamivelf neutral aountrits, whose 
#&b smdmm p m c e  an objective word, but dm- 
: ~ ~ ~ ~ t h e i r ~ t o r c ~ e e ~ f ~ ~ t i m ~ t t o  
Z &-1 at d W v e .  
E c,,- -+Q -: @tion o f ~ u * c g  has in this regard pmved unstable 
the deI@on of the U,B.S.R. could not count 4- 
L-'*w on her support. rz 
ba ~ i s p t r p u d i k e l y t h a t t h c m w i l l b e a n y ~ t i a l ~ a t t h e  
E'\; &&~~Icc iW. It may be that there will be certain dramatic 
- ,  E-. mmmrb, ss there were even during the scsions of the  om- 
?: .  - mWon, but in the last resort " common sense " wi l l  p r c d ,  
t- w.'.complon~"inthiecasebeingthepointdviewofFranoe, 
* cm&s in not permitting any form of d' a, whilat 
- . b tkm a n  M y  be any doubt. But indhdy it may be very 
1- fmItfuI. Throughits &ura it may oomplcte the pichue of the 
: - - whit condition of the worId. It may add some 
-, h w y  m h m  to the terrible picture of the pesent order of society, 
: rrfiich reminds one of a live bomb with a lighted and awifdy 
- -  -fuse. 
' There is no such thing a~ a hopeless situation. H d t g  has e 
- w q  out The clam-conscious, o q p k d  workm know that way. 
- ~ r ~ ~ b t h e g r e a t e s t + b l e ~ h ~ i a . o d ~ t o  
~ t b e g r m s t t p o f ~ 1 4 ~ v i n g h d t y f r o m t h e ~ ,  +* -, cold-bloodmi, " mmmm wmc " madnwa, the 
-4- 
CC- l , fad,  iucmigible mahas of the present ruI- of 
-. . 

I B  THE $ O m  mDm FOR DmwMAMEm 1 
~ t b e p r a m 3 i s e n g i V t B ~ ~ ~ t s t b a t t t e G G m t W ~ r  
d m l l d i n d & t r c r b e " ~ w a r , " a o t h e ~ d 8 d t h e ~ o f  
the workem, gmm ~ e a i i g h b e n e d & d b e z . g t o t a b a d k c t  
part in politid I&. h the gears following on the war-years of 
u n i v d  h a p ~ v d d m m t ,  of the haling of wounds, both on the 
part of tk de&ated and the victorious-the popular h o u r  for 
the a b a W  of war i n d ,  and carmot, in the opinion of the 
Soviet Ddqati011, be saMed by the stabilktion or slight 
reduct& of amamen& or mr budgets. What ia required is to 
b d  r way for putting an end to war. 
T h 9 ~ G u v e m m e n t i s n o t t a k h g p a r t i n t h b C o n f ~  
I w- of formal obligatim, and not under my stimdus from 
;@de. From the very first dap of ha existence it condemned 
as aa. btnunent of national policy, by dtbds as well as by . 
and I@ cooperation with other States. Once war is 
~ a s a n ~ o f n a t i o n a l p o I i c y t h e S o v i e t G o v e m -  
me& ncm no need for maintaining armies and other armed forrxs, 
&d, on its first ap-ce at an intematiod Cooference--at 
Gcma ten yam -it proposed general di-ent an 
s p m  u M n g  in m a t  countries, would be total 
dhd &at no w, protocob, or intemati 
tioa318. d d  create real securit~r for d cowtrie~. 
view wan disputed in the Commkion. Our waminge 
l & a r m e d h ~ o f t h e o t b e s p ~ W ~ h w b i c h a f l ~ d  .- 
~-a are being employed and thowan& am beiag killed 
- 
-dwounded,arebeingwa@bttwemtheregulartmqaaf~ 
T r r a e , a l l t h i a i s & a n f a r ~ f r o m G e n m , f a r a ~ h m  
~ p t , b u t ~ h o h a o ~ ~ t i ~ s a t o ~ i n g o o d f a i t h ~ *  
~ ~ ~ w h i c h h a v e b e g u n w i l l b l i n l i t e d t o t w o c o ~  
-only ortoonccw1tinentonly? Whoh~ooptimistiC~ta 
-- 
' ~ w ~ t l y t h a t t h e e v e a & i n t h e F a W a r a n a t t h s  
= ~ o f a m w a r , w h i c h i n ~ t , ~ , a n d ~ w  
the Iatest &&lid inventim+bmorl may dip the * 
-. 
k a f t h e h s t m r ?  C o n t i n e n b a r e n o l o n g c r ~ y d  
pi i t id ly  isow There am C O M ~  belonging to thm 
meeontinat. T h c m m n a t m a n y ~ i n E ~ f ~ p c ~  
c a r i ~ ~ ~ ~ t e r r i t o r i a t ~ t o d ~  T h e e & e n t o f ~ f i o n t i e f s  
i s ~ n o w t h a n i t w a s b e f o r e t h e w a r .  Caawe b e m -  ' 
dmt Mmnces will not be thmwn into the melting pot, if a 
~ m n e o f t k e ~ S t s t ~ ~ d ~ d r a g g a d i n t o w a r ?  Gra td 
* d t h i s m a y n o t h ~ t b n t t h e h i n & F a r M m a y b  - 
keptwithinIocalbun&,evcnthen~sto.webeaurethet~.  
~ ~ n o t b ~ o u r i a ~ ~ o f t h c ~ 1 d ?  Whskiabo 
-this? ~ o ~ o n s a n d p a c m ?  But- : 
secn that th;ey are hapable of either preventing or d i n g  - 
m i k a r y a c r i v i t i e s i n t k F a u b t , P P i t h d t h c ~ d  : 
*&ti=. Pubkopiniom2 Ithdmoreimptenk -&& 
~ P A e r d , w h a i s p u b l i c ~ ?  Haaamerben 
F*, or w m d  a sin& purpc~# 3 Pubh 
@ e m d i n ~ P r e 6 a o r t h t o u g h p u M i c ~ s e ~ s s  
. - 
a 
*. . 
f 
+3 
bww8, w d g p l e  b o f ~ o u ~  mtriee md of 
~ ~ o f ' p r i v & t a ~ r i a e , s t n d t v e n o f i n d i v i d u & i n  
t h e  mtfk Hawe not the acts of v i o k  going on under our 
v w g ' ~ ' & &  Rr East, their advocam and instigators in ths 
' kn  the b ,of c d e s  not immcdhtely m-ed ? 
Hawwe nat d,, quite lately, articles in both European and 
&&cm pqms urging the n d t y  and &my of the cxkmion 
&dw wnr in the Far %at, and d y  su@g that war would 
b a  out of the di, of that v q  crisis the acutenwa of which 
mmt be &bed to the late war md its consequences. 
Nor can the WtaGon of armaments be expeckd to prevent 
&a abd of fmh  wars. At the pment moment d Statm are 
mkBciently supplied with a m m n e n m d  mmments sharp 
enough and destructive enough-to conduct a war, in comparison 
with which the Great War would appear mere child's play. The 
duction of armaments is equally inapabb of guaranteeing ua 
against any war, especially if such reduction ia not very redid 
4 is not carried out with the conscious purpose of placing 
obmch in the way of war. 
' The Goviet Delegation, basing its attitude upon the needs of 
&Q p m t  moment, and the demands of the papular m m a ,  
&ae demands which necessitated dl the preliminary work of 
the Conference, and which called the Conference its& into being, 
would sum up the problem before us in the words : " Semritg 
qpbt war*" It is this that d i s h g u j s h ~ ~  ourconception of d t y  
&om the wnoeption of other delegatiom, many of whom, when 
they speslr of security, m e .  the assuring of thc utmost p d b l e  
chancts of victorg to a State subjected to attack. The Soviet dele- 
@on considers that we must endeavour to make war itself im- 
gDaaible since it is the people who suffer, both in the victorious 
d d d d  countries, and moreover, as the last war has shown 
n~, tbe people in all countries. The Soviet delegation a p p b  
b n  thh standpoint all propah made to the Preparatory Com- 
-onI or to be made to thia Conference, including the French 
bicb are worthy of more than a mere passing duaion. 
, as a mark of mpect that I =pond to the invitation ! ' n 7 4 *  FmCb Delegation, to criticiae and d i m  its praposal. 
#%kd fmemat it must be stated that from the mint of view 

~jt$lasteringrnanmynlnniaginto~ona,atta&a~rnPjW 
. ~ & & a n i t d I  Itiagui~obviausthatafewhundred 
~~more~ id iersmthes ideof theweakcr  Statewoolldnot 
- ba a decisive factor, and u, such an  in^^ srmy, 
$rfmm preventing war, muld not even dwaya emtm the v h q  
w h a t ~ t c e 5 w o y l d t h e r e b e t h s t d  
would be put into operation; and that in 
wea%erprtytordctwaecruahed2 
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FIGHT 'FOR DIBARIMAMEMT 
~ ~ ~ W i t l b e ~ e n t I y i r n b r z e d w i t h t h t ~  
&@&m~in aih interrutid orgmisation and its imphl i tp ,  
their d Q  to it, and p h  their own national troop 
a t h d h p d ?  
The @on of an international army arose and was diacusscd, 
X 1 mn mt &en, tbirteen years ago, when the Covenant of 
dm w e  of Nations was being dtawn up, and it was then dp 
uded in the negative. And at that time the  was much more 
faith in in-tional orpisations than now. Even five m o n k  
ap there wm mom faith in inmnational oqphation8. As for 
intematiod differwlca and nationaI egoism, s d y  these have 
not been dimhished during the last thirteen yem I A glance over 
events in tbe sphere of international economic relations dl suf6m 
& convince us of this. 
I p over the question of the extent to which the Swiet Union 
a u l d  be expected to confide its aecuritg and a part of irs own 
4- to an international oqanht ion consisting largely of Statm 
openly h& to it, even to the attent of refusing to m a i n b  
normal relations with it. The workers and p a n t s '  of the Soviet 
Union are more likely to see in an international army created in 
mch miditima a threat to their countrg. 
I feel bound, therefore, to state f m d y  that as far as security 
against war, and, therefore, d t y  of States, are commcd,  the 
French prop& arouse grave doubb in our minds. The Soviet 
delegation i thereby only strengthened in ia conviction that the 
only M b l e  way to the solution of the problem of the o q m k -  
tion of peace, the problem of averting war, the problem of ~~ 
&tJr to all nations, ia the way recommended by it, the way of 
g p e d  and total dhmament. 
It would, however, bt wrong to infer from what I have said that 
&B Soviet delegation denies the importance and &cacy of all 
other wap of 00~180lidating pemrce short of total dhammmt. The 
Bwkt GovwPmmt has &own its r e d h a s  for intwpationd co- 
takjngpartiniaetie~ofinterostionalcongramand 
and by the prop& which it brought before them. 
do WB underrate the importance of in-tional d e d  
for pace My Governmtnt adhered to &t 
at tbe time and cvcn put it into force with 
. . - . - -  
- -75- 
:' 
.%tta which ategorid  
all other p h  by ib eimpliut~7 and by the with which it could 
be carried out, and with which its &tion could be con- 
A plan for total -t would etiminata all those d S d t  
d thomy quatiom which d e  the work of the 
~ 0 ~ 1 ~ l ~ - o u t , c o n d r m n a d t o ~ t h a i n -  
numedlc in-oasl cod- of the last few years, held ia 
~ ~ t s l s o n t h e @ w o f ~ , a n d g a v u ~ b o  
~ ~ ~ * t R h t C h t h i s ~ h a s m e t ,  
~ a w W i q . a n d ~ o f ~ ~ f w d c ~ u n t r i t ~ d d  
~ b ~ a ~ t b g ~ o f t o ~ ~  hrcgarch 
~ h h ~ o b k t h a t h d d b e m u c h & t a  
h d  a 8- orst when making tanlss, -on, machine guns, 
boding-phm, in spite of intematid undertaking, than if il 
~ d y ~ i t a ~ ~ t p u t o f ~ w e a p o n s a b o v e t t a e p e r -  
M m d y  m b W d .  It w d d  be d c r  to hd 
r S t a t b ~ w h m ~ i ~ ~ p o p u l a t i o n i n t h e u s e o f ~ c  
grnss d bad-throwing, in thc hce of i n m d  prohibition, 
, t a a n P k ~ d y b m w h g i t s s u m g h c & ~ ~ t a g e  
L@wdown. 
, .  Immt,~,onccsgaincmphaBkthefactthattheSoviel 
has by no m- come bexe merely to put before you 
-@& tinw i~ propod for tad md general d h m a m a t ,  or 
;W ddm that we we de tembd to have all or nothing* complete 
dbmmmmt or none at d. We have no iIIusi~18 w h a m r  as ta 
lttrs Errte in for our propition. Our delegation, ladim and 
~ h t d ~ ~ ~ d t h ~ ~ y p f o @ t m d i n g t ~  
d w a  amammts, and the further such reduction goes, the more 
.- will the Soviet delegacio11 take part in the work of the 
Co&d&ng the &aft Convention drawn up by tk 
--8tpaOrJr -
. . 
altogether hadequate, the soviet 
- W g a t b  wi l l  ad- herc itti own draft for the reduction d l-, which, however, it re@a merely as the h t  step 
'wmfdatuddiw L 
' , - < I d r e m i n d t h e C o n f e r e n o e t b a t t h c g o v i e t ~ o n m  
die ht to pwpaee in its & draft Convention put before tbe 
cp- 'on, the compk. dumidon of the mout 
~ ~ o f ~ w 1 ~ , i n e l ~ :  
r. Tanks snd q - h e a v y  long-range artillery. r+ 8hips dupwarda of 10,- tans disp-t. 
M d a d k q o v e r  xainchratibre. 
. $ ~ ~ l e k  
6. l h y  W m g - p b ,  all of air barnbe and any 
oohetmtanaof&hxtionforudlefrwnaetoph 
7. All mmm and qpramn far Ehemid, incendiarg and 
W W a K h  
ofweakermtri~indangerofaggrdoa Itwillwarmly 
support any prop& approaching or outstripping its om.  It- 
will suppm the equal rigbEg of aU prticipanta in the Cdmnm - 
and equaI d t y  for all S~ates. 
The mmtrp I r e p e n t  is in a less favourablc @tion ae re- 
than other countria. Only fourtten yearn ago, it . -  
of an armed atmck on all ib frontiem, of b k k d a  
e x i s t i n g ~ d o m  f 
nnificdsincedle- :.? 
;rnR EwmWMmr 
w w -  
T b e i m p e n ~ ~ ~ u f w w i e e a u a i n g ~  damnand
m d n g  u p i v ~ ~ ~ k h  Thin ataxm and mpieion, to@a 
with the lhk d taxatia impowl upon the people for thn 
~ ~ ~ o f h u g c ~ f o ~ ,  arenourhhingand 
intadjhg4b v t  economic d m ,  which is felt in aII iu 
weightr@ afad Eomnaat by the working clashierr. In thae 
~of thehour i eno t theqe t i t i ono fany  
the reduction of armaments or war budgets, 
which is bound to come up againat m e n d o u s  
obstacb, but the actual prevention of war, through the cmtion 
againstwar. Thktask~anonlybecdedwt 
delegation wiil move r mlution to tl& c f h ,  con- , 
h & d  as it ie that there would be no extend o w e  to the 
out of general dissrmammt if Govemmenta here repre- 
wtad ahow their mdin- for it. 
t sole aim of the Soviet Wmmmt is the building up of k c k l h  on the of the Soviet Union, and in the face 
d Ctlae daccomplishment of the &st Five Year Plan, of 
* l a d  dicvcments in werg sphere of economic life, it seems to 
soPia defegation thost what h been obvious from the be- 
must by now be as clear as daylight to d and sundry- 
that the Soviet Union r e m ,  n e i k  the increase of 
~ , m r i n t e r & r e n ~ t i n t b e a f h r i r s  of &mtiom,to d k e  
&&q and could therefore do without army, navy, military 
~ m d d a b u f o r m s o f ~ n e d f o r c c a .  Itdoes,howew, 
~ ~ t h e a s s ~ c e t h a t t b m d b E n ~ a t t e m p ~ S o v i e t  
W h y  either rrnd that other States will not interfere in ib 
i n ~ * , 8 Q d t h a t t b a t b ~ ~ c Q ~ d  
~ b e ~ w i t h f r o m w i t h o u t .  Itwillodyfeelthi~assur- 
unwi#othtr Strrtes a h  agree to give up their oumed force. 
Hbur when tk whole wwld is going through sn u n w  
ecomiqiic *, which is ehaking the edifice of the clrpi- 
its foundations, the masm of the people sutTering from 
~ ~ t o a n e x c e n t h i ~ ~ w n , f r o m u n i d  
wage dwtipna, tlxamed by further economic upheavalsS 
thtfullb&dwbi,&therulinghmdiryshiftonaW 
~ , m ' r P a t b s ~ m f a r ~ ~ b l e f r m a & ~ t a f t h e  + 
w a r W h i & t h e ~ o f $ P b  
population of over xba d o n .  Thie itla is by no mmm U b p b  
initself; b u t i t c a n b t m a d e U ~ h b y i t s r e j e c r i ~ f l b y t h t ~  
h m  rqaenttd here. 
WE hope that tIte mpomible repmentativ#i of 8- here 
prumt will treat the idea exp& by the S d e t  delegation 6 . 
the seriouan- which the problem of amring to all nations real 
q$mt war, red peace, d m  
dommeinhvitingmeto 
nae an qpr tun i ty  of 
which I often h m  'ta 
oncc more of tbe 
- in .the Sarviet Union L followed in your country. The fact that 
- ~ o f h r i ~ 8 1 1 ~ a n d t m c t o r s a r e i n u s e i n o u r  
--- and giant indusm enterprises, as w d  as in colltctive 
k n ~ ,  and thousands of H a m  e q k e m ,  medmia and 
murkem src taking an active part in the construction of our 
. -. The people of the Soviet Union arc also following the 
-. lifk d literature in America with the greatest interat. 
mew-at any m, inter- 
onetar&dwithbdkof 
, .. , 
. . . . -  - 
- -L .. 
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m m m  FXGRT FOR lmdmwmm v .  
' =s 
. - d ~ d t f w o t b t r . w i t h * ~ d - , t E v s  
&&damwonthefieldofba#le. W e ~ a u ~ t l y ~  
* f h b ~ o n ~ p e a e a d m w n t h e W h o f p m m  
war. w h u l ~ l e h s n ~ @ i m ~ d t k ~ ~  
dthcm,itbth&thingto-hamtofopt5misrrr, 
~ t o t h e g o o d ~ ~ a n d ~ ~ t H e ~ o f .  
~ p e g e i m i s t s w h o M ~ t h e k ) n a A a ~ * t h t  
r f E d ~ ~ t h a t ~ w a a I d h e l p t b e  
~ m d , d b e o f a n y w t o t h e ~ o f d i s l  
-t and peace, k h e  me, Lndk d Gentha, psoll 
w o d d b r f m m m y l i p s t b e n w s t ~ ~ a n d ~  , 
p q h k .  W e d h o w ~ C o u C q s t a n , a c w d i n g ~ ~ w h i C h  
a n y i l b 8 ~ ~ c u r s d i f d y t b e ~ - h b d f  
cmtidly~hcie~illstd,butis,omfhtcontrpty,,"~ 
d q , i n e p e r g w a y , " ~ d ~ .  I w d d q r ~ ~ t a & p t  - 
~ ~ t e l l i a g ~ d o t h ~ t v e r ~ r m i n u t e t h p t o h e ~  
s e r e n c C i s & n g l d m p I y a p ~ d l y , t h a t ~ e v t r y d a y ~ w a y  
w e a m ~ g m w e a n d m o r t , t h a t p e s c e s n d q u i c t ~ i n  
& F a r W , t h a t t f i e p o E b l i n d ~ o f ~  him EW 
bsen i d h g Q a ,  tbrrr the a m l m  of the 8 q m h  4 
~ & f m m C h i n a ~ h a @ t o & c i d e w i t h t b  
~ o f ~ u r i a b y h i g n ~ , I m d t h t m o r a l &  
~ t ~ b f u n t a d & c ~ o f b o t h J ~ ~ ~ a n d ~  
w p , a m d a u t r i d ~ * g r e n a d # , a n d ~ i n t o ~  
, rguib and fmwmh 
W 1 E h o u t ~ t o ~ a n g r ~ o n s m t b e ~ ~ s f t b a  
heDr. b a d , a n d h i s w p h E o r t h e ~ t d t h e i n * ,  
I ~ b o r t n d t o ~ t H a t I d o n o t ~ m i n t h l s ~ ~  ' 
~ e d t o t h e i l l a o f t h b o d y ~  Hereitsctmstonmetbat 
m e r e ~ d a a n o t ~ ~ b ~ d i e n o t  
. hadably a sthdua to action. Indeed, hiartorg has ue - 
- ~ c o n ~ s n t m ~ t d c o m p l n c r e n c y a r e ~ f r P m b e i a g & m ~  - 
p o w w a d ~ , ~ t h e G O l ~ o f ~ i s ~ ~  1 
~ ~ ~ 1 ~ 8 c @ . t h a t W e h e v e m o m ~ *  
- a p d i m i s m ~ t h a n p p e h p d m t h c e m a f t t t e ~  mm 
; ~ i t i a t r u e , h d y j u a t b e e n b o m , a f b e r ~ ~  - 
g p # l a m g a d ~ p w , ~ h = - y e t ~ n r t - w 6 @ ~ ~  
O h O f i P B ~ ~ ~ f t , ~ t t t r t ~ ~ e j t h a s # r f a r ~ - ~ -  - 
a6 THE ~~ FZGHT FOR Dl-NT 
~ ~ ~ ~ , h w d w t b e t n s a c h w t o e n a b t e w t o ~  
~ o f i t a ~ a Q r n g t h , ~ p a c i t y ~ ~  ' 
For, after all, up to the p m t  we have Id nothing but the 
@ dccl;& d delegations, we have learned the positions 
up by d m  -& in these declarations. Them 
. 
at the Conference itself, that certarin G w e m e a t s  declare 
ddr entire dkgnement with any reduction of amments what- 
bythefixatepedwsmadeat the Cunfermcethqarenonearer 
to mlutiw now. 
Taking it all round I can see no grounds for optimism. 
If, in addition to dl this, you take into consideration that in 
my opinion, the opinion of the Soviet Wegation, wen the 
. be d t y  agaht  war, and tbat our appeal for total general 
dkmanmt, for the creation of this the only guarantee againat 
-, has found no response at the Conference, you fl readily 
~ h t I a m t h e l a s t p e m o n f t o m w h o m t o e x p e c t a n o t e  
which hme been made at the Conference 
itself might be Bitietdced We 
could only be interpreted 
on or redudon of armamenes, and that the 
d d  with tht quation of armaments. It 
dt im pmaihg in m a  comtries, natiaa d &tm i 
o m l y h m u ~ ~ w h c n n o o n e c s n a ~ ~ , ~ ~  
x w a t m s w i t h w b i c b f ~ ~ , w i t h w h i c b t o ~ p y ~  
&tory, with which to subjugate other nations. The 
B f t h e o p ~ t ~ v i t w e t e o n l ~ d t ~ r i n t l t e ~ ~ ~ r l ~ I ~  1 sft6eobnnasofvict0ry,by.the~tribution,cn-b 
-. d t y .  D w  it d y  amount to mything glare 
honwrod principle of the balance of power, which 
dhmamtat, a&m the &lition of &whim d 
in D-, riterature, the cinema, a 0 0 1  boka, tcrgs 4.. 
I 
, -- 
FIG* FOR 'mawmMEm 
, politid adwaturm, counter- 
~ t l l  themaelve to-day to J a w ,  
&vemment, and the Soviet Union took p w  in it g u y  
. ,aid pl& an active part in it. But all thh haa littIe to do with 
abolition or reduction of armaments, and for my part I am 
. :@cad that it is pradsely the existence of armaments, and of 
So~onga~amedforceexhthaewiU be faithin 
+bility of getting the uppm hand of neigbboum 
armaments, and through politid combinations, 
a m g y  for that. 
I may be tord that governments are often compelled by public . ' 
opinion in their own mtrh to m a i d n  armaments and purmc 
chaminktic pIicy, and that, therefore, as public opinion 
more atlightened its pm3mre will 1- and g0vemmeIlta TRin be 
mom amenable to the iderr of dimmamat. I amat &ue this .' 
view. Campaigns of &ud&n and national hatred, the eethg , 
uf nation against nation, have never yet come from the haxt of 
the masam. Such -pip are dwap organised and e y  
&ad by d gmup inwrested in war-& p m p n d w ~ ,  
&e manufacture of munitions, and war h d q ,  poteatid war 
profiteers. They very often a d  in potsoning the miads of 
the masses for their own ends. Deprive t k e  p u p  of their base* 
move them from war Muartry, destroy this indmtr~r, d#rtroy 
~ h o p e s o f w a r , a s l d o f p m f i ~ m b e h ~ f r o m w a r , a n d ~  
~ k ~ m d k t o s p e n d ~ o n ~ c h ~ ~ w o u l d  
.,3u&ak&ketim of b m h p t q  forthe Confermce, and would 
-3m&4$Iiit&# are mvind that the Disamammt ConfemEc 
* * w a Penny in prrund 
~ P . r i n n m ~ d ' w h ~ ~ a b d n f m n ~  
-- 
If tm a#sPeh my importance to the pmaure of public @on 
. . 
- aa tbe Conf-ce we must reah that the bctrer informed pubIic 
 isas as to all that goes w attheCoafeffnce,and theleesit 
b w q ~  iQBelf up with false h o p ,  and c o d a  i d f  with ihi01ls 
m #3 p p w  made, the stponger will that pre88ure be. 
IshouJ.dbc8orrptoh~ywuadcrthcimp&mthat~ 
~seeonepintorhg . totheexdus ionofdoth~ .  AsIhave 
ijd, we do not ignore the impomce of security, m o d  
&a t and all other good things, which may be propod 
to the Conference, but we are deiinitcly a@st their being 
m h t h t d  for dbrmament. The more time we spend tdhg  
abut murity and moral dhmment, the ha we shall disarm, 
and the more we redly do d h m ,  the more d t ~ r  and moral 
dis twillbeachieved 
I n o o n c l ~ o n , X a h o u l d l i Z r e ~ ~ k ~ ~ l e d o n o t ~  
h k  for tht of heawity in the proper p h .  Some 
d e l w  at the Conference, for bee, e m  regarded the fact 
that the Soviet Union does not belong to the M e  of Nations 
m a cause of huflicient securiq. It is noiemrthy tbat such 
misghkq were e x p d  by r epmw~b th rn  of shtm t b d v e ~  
~~g no relations with the Soviet Unioa. This i atmost 
like trying to get a man, whose aqdatance you do not desirt, to 
join your club. If, however, we are to 100% mywhere, outside of 
M v f s ,  for Wra creahg an &umng politid 
atmosphere, mhtmst and insdility, we are more likely to fiad 
them in the &ce of politid and economic cstrqemmt 
bmem several on the one band a d  the Soviet Union, 
with its rb million inhabitants, on the other. In this respect we 
only have to glance at the even& now going on on the &ores of 
ttas Ps&k, where three of the biggest P&c countria, namely, 
dxe U.S,SR, China and U.S.k, are involved in mch e8- 
I don't think much haghation and poliiicd &dq 
- ~ ~ ~ & o w t h c ~ t t o w h i c h ~ ~ ~ h a s  

From ~ g z g  to 1931 
k The ataatmphic uphcrrvaIa and dhdmms awed by the 
world war are only now beginning to make thunscIvm felt in dl 
b i x  imphddity, and am perunpmdy p m t i n g  their accourrt 
to humanitp. When advocating the Swiet Draft Convmtiom for 
** t at the 1927 md rm kana of the P r e m  
h C o r d s h ,  1 referred h~ the everergrowing of a fmh 
war; b u t t h c ~ o n a t t h a t t i m e r e g a r d e d t h i s a s a t o o  
&mMc view of the inkmational situation, not ju&d by 
the chams- If the Prepamtoq C o ~ o n  were to 
adhere to this appraisat now, it wouId find i H  at vatisnce 
with recent deckitions by statesmen and the Pma of capitalist 
aountries, pronouncing the most g h y  diagnosis of the 
pmmt international situation, pointing to the anxiety and alarm 
fdt by dI with m g d  to the imminent deveIopment of this 
mtwtion, and evm d g  dehite analogies between the times 
b d i a k 1  y p m d h g  the world war and the pmeat moment 
Indeed, d m  not the intem%cation of polithi 
md economic antapism confront us d y  and b t e n i & y  
, -unta@ms finding new and fertile soil in the general economic 
* a t p r m l t ~ c e d ~ c r i & n ~ e v e n t o b e s h a k e n & b y  
I ! pnti-&wkt incantations 2 Doea not the a istence in Europe done 
$ of mmthbq Eke million peraions belonging to dad 
1: . .. , in Borne countries comprising -third to one-half of 
; r Z Z  popuiationS and n n r  morr insistently uging tbdr 
,- d u e  to praa upon the i nkmut id  Bituation 1 Can 
!.-.G j p m  h-w&t intem%catim of the auencx un 
PI, *.
? I 3s 
- 
- .  - 
-73 . 
d rerrerves of military area increased, so &at the d t  is not 
&e diminution hut tk in- of the d-ve powtr of the- 
& amcemed If we rrim at dhmammt, it ia tbe reduction 
M the geraerat p0tentia.l of dmmction and not padd di fhg af 
~witbinrgivenmilitarywarbudgetwhkhwcmeaa 
The opponents of disarmament have for many ycarar been sing- 
ing hgmarr to ''-rity," which is in their qw, apparently, a 
lufffcientandexclusivegriaraateeofpeaee. Theyhave- 
t h e ; ~ 0 1 1 w i t h i n t h c P r e p a r a t w y ~  . . daspecial 
p.-- 
- 
cy 7.  -- - - 
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i . .  
- ? .--  ~ ~ , p a r ~ m t h e P a c t , o f ~ h d ~ n n d d a s o h -  
, . . ~ ~ ~ d t h E ~ ~ e n t a i l e d .  
w p d d y  obviow that the mere mdusi01~ of *m, 
- q$md,manyothm~tieanbmoerzr,andnmtbc~rrrm 
- @nhg of a gen&ral pact for the mun&on of war, are incapable 
d - e  that international d d e n c t  which shodd d l e  
- 
8 ~ t o f o ~ ~ d s a g e r o f ~ d t o c e a s e i n ~ v e p r e p a r s l -  
- - tima for war. Add m thi. the fact that, under the of 
Y r 4  deCUrifJl rs masum, conceived by their authors and c x p m t s ,  eempatxatme p r h y  is only to be created for a single group of 
~ ~ e ~ , a t t h e e x p m a e o f t b e " ~ ~ " o f o t h e r c o u n ~  
gmup pims are puraued, and 
t become in their turn 
~ o f " ~ t y  " a t t h e p ~ t t i m e a n d i n t b e f w m a d ~ d  
wander that, among the countries which were the loudest in their 
dcmanda for " " guamnhxa, and which made provident 
-d M & C m d ~ ,  - SOme h ~ b * h  e  ChkfS of d w  
stafFB were, es ia now common knowledge, at the asme rime de- 
vising and carrying out plans for the provacation of war with their 
-. 
What conclusions should be d m n  from ad thk ? How are we & to protect o d v m  lgsinst the imminat b g e r  of wpr To us, 
th rep-tatiives ofthe Soviet Union, and exponents ofdehite 
do-cwnomic themias, the impmsibiliq of removing the politico- 
-  a n t a g o h  of uipitdist sod*, and hence the ultimate 
hdabdity of war is perfdy clear. W e  believe, however, or wt 
I h o a n a h h q h t h e d a n g a o f - m i g h t b e m b 1 ~  
. . .  dunlnlahed, or made comparatively remote., by m e  memare of 
- real " L The grater the degree of the duction of 
~ t h c l a w w i t l  bethedqerofattemptingtosolvcexisthg 
b y ~ ~ C C B .  
NewUbgto pdongthe&by Eruitlcm dillcwh, the 
- .C - 
S O m " 8  FIGHT ma nmwmMmm 
invite the Co&on to mMtute throughout the draft Con-- 
ti00 the words " Reduction and limitation of A n m m a b  " for -. h -
t E a b t t r m t ~ L h i r t i o n o f ~ ~ . "  Odythrts~theimpm+ 
8 i o n r c m a i n i n g b m t h c f i r s t h a l f o f t h e s i x t h ~ ~ b e ~  
-1 
- - 
- 
d d - t h e  i m p k o n  that the Ccmmhi0~1 in- 
tends to pxopose, instead of a redudon, a med Emitstion of m- J 
xnenm at the prerrent level, even leaving scope for further -. -3 - - 
The Soviet Megation next p w  a -on of the 
&on formerly decided in the negative, of the inclusion smong 
&e objw of the Convention of trained xeservcs, as one of the -- 
paSncipal elements of the bhgermt power of modem axxlPies, 
appalling as much on account of the millions which will be sent to 
~ f r o n t i n t i m e o f ~ , ~ m a c ~ ~ l f l t ~ f t h e h m ~ o f t h ~ ~ ~ ~  a 
mds they main* under arms. Further, the Soviet ddegation 
hd& out for the inclusion in the Convention of reserves of f i t a r g  
mataids enabling vast rrxmies to be equipped for war. The 
-t diminution of armed f o m  in the form of the numerid 
&udm of troop is at present more than compmated for by 
'&e impregnation of armie~ with military technhl suppk. The 
e a m ~  appiies, of course, to m i t i q  amplanee in -8. 
h ~ t i n g t h e P r e p ~ r y ~ m t o r e v e r t t o a t l e s e t t h r a e  - 
~pationa I have enumerated, the Soviet ddegatiw also has in 
mfnd a cjertain altemticm in the m e m W p  of the 
~ 0 1 1 ~ , a r i s i n g p ~ y o u t o f t h e # c o m i n g i n E o ~ O E  
mm Gonmmmta m some countriw, and also the chsnm in vim 

rHE SOVIET% FIGHT FOR 
I- - cowf#rm# : 
It must be remembered that the Conmhion h not 
rnptbing or imposing any obligations. It is d y  
ma- for the coming Disamament Conkact .  It BID 
~ t h a t t h e w o & O f t h C C o m f t t e ~ ~ t W i l f b e @ y ~ ~ d  
d m u k d  if it be cornfrontad with a draft Convention coqkahbg 
e v e  -for the reduction of amamenb, even if wme 
pwem mainmixi -ticmi with regard to cemh q d o i t &  
In any case, there can be no question of unanimous acceptma of 
the Draft Convention, as the many deckations h d y  made 3n 
CommWon p M y  ahow. What d m  it matter, then, if 
#rmaa rawmations come from Sates opposing this or thar 
measute for the reduction of armaments ? Thua hlntd, with 
their d o n a ,  such S t a h  might, under pramre of public 
@ion, change their attitude by the time the Conferam m 
COP-d, and then manhity might be restcbed, not on minhm, 
but on martimum memum of diaamamc11L The Prepmorp 
Cmmnhion will be performing but poor service to the -use of 
dbmmment and the cause o f p c e i f ,  instesd ofthis, it ahmi at 
screening Govemmenb making memations and at pmtdng 
them from the critichm of pubfic opinion. 
I am a+g here with complete fmhew,  without 
m p t  at diplomacy, tbinkjng of nnothing bu't the interem a f  
d ' t, for the Soviet delegation cannot, at this d i d  
r n ~ a ~ n t ~ a p e a % o t h ~ w i t h ~ t o ~ ~ o n w h i c h b d  
wch amding import for h h q .  
that it was i m m b l e  to draw any 
Powers became it was di%cult to 
, ifwe tahthefigureofthe Soviet 
taw with m,m~ t ~ n s  would have to 
, drawadistinction between Naval Pawerswcmustinsertsomcligwe 
- 
~rgureent: of Lord Cecil we &dl have to m amall and great 
Powera dike, which is exactly what the Soviet delegation ie 
Wbrmt will be the position if the Soviet proposal for the re- 
duction of naval ammmats is rejected and we keep 8trictIy to 
t h G I i m i ~ o n o f ~ f t 1  Whatwouldbethetoanageof the 
various navies ? Some idea may be fonned from a study of the 
h d o n  N a d  Treaty, which is offered to us as the pmtotype of 
auy future Convention on naval armaments, and has been com- 
mended to us in the letter referred to by the President and by the 
*t hhc l f .  The outstanding fact ia that the total figures for 
the displacement of the navi- of the three Parties to the Agmt- 
at the p m t  level d 
- .  
- -  - 
- - - - 
I h 5 -  . -. 
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m FtGEZr FOR 
,&&CDE~+ fAs & Of M. L m ,  aN d  XW 1930, d 
* ~ d M e & g ~ * N m d ~ C ~ O f ~ ~  
t w g r ~ ~ f a p * ~ ~ ~ C ~ b l ~ r '  
- Ithinkthequ&cwha&pIeone .... E-bCovmantof 
tbLeagueofmim+inArticIeaofduetirnofam=- 
,&enis, not of limitdon. If the Stub-Cornmiwee bm mhstitnbbd 
' ~ t h e T R o r r h i ' ' r e d u c t i o n W t h e d " ~ O t t , " h h ~  
~ ~ g d t h e ~ o f t h e L e a g u e o f N ~ .  f t i s n o t k  
a s e m t o d ~ t h e ~ o v ~ n a n t o f t h e ~ L e a g a e N ~ o n a r , I d y  
~ t i o n ~ i n & r h a t ~ ~ d x m t b e a b l e t o t a k t  
~ r o f a ~ i n ~ C o v e a a n t o f ~ ] t a a g u e o f N s t i ~ , a s ~ s ~ ~  
hendonehere. I n a n y ~ , w e t h h k t h h q u d ~ r l i o f t b *  
' ~ i m p o r ~ a n c t a n d ~ t h e w o x l d s t ~ o u l d k n o w ~ t h e  
-Repamoq -on is prephg  for. IB it prepoUing: for 
-limbdon* =#on or s of amamenb 3 
w e ~ o t h e t m d e 8 1 : m a n s w c r ~ a h a t ~ 0 1 ~  -
I 
4 TEE BOVIEF'S FIGHT FOR DI- 
demand aom~'gtmptb in tbdr favour, but it ia not 
t O o P c e g e n ~ m c a n i n g o f t h e ~ " ~ 0 n " b y i n ~ c i n g  
~ w w d a l l ~ " i f ~ i . "  ThisdmeanthatthePmpara- 
borp Cummidon h l f  is not sure that any raductia is p d b h  
I ~ o b j e c t t o t h b m w ~ d m m t .  
&&&* the s p d  Of M. L m w ,  on N m d h  I&& 1934 
a t ~ ~ M ~ 0 f ~ N d ~ ~ " t r s b Q f t h  
l+.bpa*880ry C d s h  for tlbe DismrnarnaEt 
cqfmdmcd : 
We know of M t i m  inq d a t i o n s  in London, Washinen, 
and Geneva, dealing with limi~on only, and it would t h d o m  
aeun logical to add the words " if poasible " wherever the word 
" limitation " in d, and even to call the Co-on itstlf 
" hpamtorg Commkion for the Dhmamnt-if-@le 
Conference." 
I do not see how it is possible to w e  that budgetary limitation 
will follow automatidy on the figus imemd in regard to th 
limitation of personnel and war material. You could quite welt 
limit the quantity* and at the -e time improve the quality, 
which would n h  y in- cqenditure. This is not provided 
for in the British text, and the Soviet delegation propom to pm- 
videforandpreventit. If,aahrdCecilargues,thesefigureswue 
m t o m d d y  c o ~ t e d ,  budgetary limitation in g e n d  would be 
umamwy. Ud- reduction is mentioned, the British amend- 
ment d low a great deal of its d u e .  I should like a - 
vote to be taken on the two amendments, d I ahdl have a few 
words to say later in regard to the other amdmcnt. 
We have jrrst finiehod with that part of the draft ~ t i m  
WMI is taken up with qudw d k d y  referring to limitation 
THE BOVlEP8 FTGHI' FOR- 
;Pain. Fondly, no doubt, we can, and probably shall, 
-en& during the third reading, butwe cnterbh no 
uto the fate of h amen-. 
X wil l  refrain at pmwnt from a g e n d  appmkl of tha 6' 
a f t h e ~ ~ 1 , d y ~ g t h a t t h a t p r t r r f t h e d r r b t ; ~  
C O ~ V M ~ ~ O ~  WE& has already b gOne thtough d m  
tbe Soviet delegation in the least, and is not in the lumt in accord- 
ance with the & which confronted tbe Prepratorp Come 
'midon in the opinion of the Soviet Govmmmi when it agmd 
to Eake part in it. We consider that the chapters drawn up am 
htpable of even being an adequate framework for decisions as to 
rrkal duetion of amaments. The e e t  delegation in coming 
b had in mind nothing but dkmammt, or at leaat considerable 
duction of armamen&, and not the mere etabilkition of d s h g  , 
-til less their increw for the sake of d h b g  
mne w of d m i l i t a r ~ r  equilibrium between. States, which is 
apparently dl that is provided for by these chapters. 
The. President : I would remind M. Litvhw, that wu we mt 
having a generaI disntssion. 
M. Litvhov : I am only x m h g  a p w d  memation in regard 
Ghapter V. The Soviet delegation mot d serious import- 
* to the technicel and oqpnkational questions which the Com- 
Man is now proad& to discuss. The attitude of the Met 
Gwemment to these questiom will depend ultimately upon dm 
m a s u e  of the reduction of armammta which may be decide4 . 
not by the &rumhion but by the Conference. The W 
dekgation will, therefore, probably abstain from voting on ' 
d thmc questions I would like, however, here and now, to &m - 
notice of the Eacr that any solution of these questions wbicb bindr, . 
the fulfdment of the Canvation, control and so on, with 
~ t o i m L € t h e r i g b t o f  
Alf the have a common o b j e c t d y ,  ta enable - 
arrg Shte to 4 the whole Convention at a favour- 
&h mammt, and thus nullify its d u e ,  which is small enough 
&dy. It is W to add that a breach of the C o n d o n  by 
a@ of the siptorp StaW wdl n e c e d y  aerrre as a pretext for 
ib Mhgemmt by other signatoh. I must, thedore, declare 
that the Soviet delegation m o t  acapt any q&em which by 
means of d c l ~  providing for derogations will deprive the 
C o n v e n t i m o f d d v a d ~ a l l e g a l p r e t e ~ r t f o r a n i n ~  - 
in -tar. 
U a c b f r w r c  tAs w$ment by M. Lm-, on N w d h  dth* 
1930, & th sijefk 8& of h +&h?y C- f& 
dhc I- DwaP=mtm CO?lferefl~c : 
What do we h d  2 On the one hand the majoritg of the 
pagraphs drafted up to date are calculated ratheref to provide for 
t h e m a i n ~ c e a n d a o m e t i m e a c v e n b i n c r e a s e o f ~  
than for their reduction ; a d  again we h d  several deiegdom 
trpiog to W o r m  the d h d o n  on publicity, and the d w i s i i  
to lx teken on the abject, into form* Iepking and sanctioning 
the principle of military 
Not only i publicity being sub&uted for the duction of 
m e n b ,  but an sttempt is being made to make. such publiciq 
& ephemd* 
The Soviet ddqgdon adheres to ita view tbat quatiom of 
pub* arc of no imptame until real dimmameat b e c o w  an 
be fa& In Yiew, however, of the present situstion, the 
h k t  d&@n supports the opinion of the q e r t a  who have 
~ t o i n a i a t t h a t p u b l i c i ~ e h w l d  b e ~ m o r e ~  
rrrQkecmfitpfwrrmla 
... . - 
r n F a R ] D ~  - " # -.. ->- 
< 
I 
Smwmt by M. Lur-, m Decmh sJ, 193% h 
~ S ~ a f k S 8 R ~ a f w y C ~ f ~ ~ I ~  
tioffal Disammmt Confsatce : 
S * i r , ~ ~ m t h e d r a f t C o n v e n t i r m a s a w h o h ~ ~ ~  
place, and 1 ahould like to avoid my mhm-ding. It is 
mdcmtd that the Soviet delegation has only nooad the 
ofthatext ofthe draft Convention by the ma,jority ofthe Com- 
&, and b not induded in that mjotiQ. 
by M. L v r J ~ m ,  on DBE* gth, 1930, at th 
~ S e s s i o a C f & R t g b Y ~ C ~ f k t h I ~  
~ D b Y m m m C o f f f e m m :  
Govenmmh arc not repreaienb6d h e ,  and yet the Unh uf 
~ S o v i e t ~ e p u b I i ~ i s ~ o u t a ~ t h e l l n e c o r m t r g w b i c h  
- w i t l , p d a p s , n o t d g n t h e ~ ~ ~ ,  - 7  By** 
. *a - 1  
- - 3s 
-M 
-:= 
- - -  
=5 
- T< F*
~ m y ~ t a t h e r t b n t o a n y  
obliged to emphmk my pint wen 
M.Lm-,m-gth, ~930, a t t h e w  
Cq6-e : 
- The M e t  M d o n  has m r  asked for hs -ti- or 
'khtabtemmt of its attitude to be deleted; it has neverurged 
Et thinLII fit Our idea was that the report was to be a true photo- 
graph ; and we added that, although we were not taking part in 
that worlr, we wished to be given m opportunity of making a 
8tatumnt to bc appended to the report. 
It i quite truc that the Pddent  told me that that was imps- 
' bible, for one reolaon or another. I promptly asked why, md I 
d e d  to the comrtkim's notice what M. Po&& had said in 
the earlier part of the S&on. H e  then promised that there would 
be a third part of the report which would embody the sbtmmmEB 
of all the delegations. No one-replied to me, but I w a ~  merely 
add whether I wished to throw any light on the situation at that 
junaure. I replied in the negative,, and added that it would be 
time u, raise the guestion after I had made my m m t .  
And so the qu&m was not nettled. The Co&on made a 
oerg radical alteration in this objective photograph by deIeting 
frosa the report our proposals and the various- refiectio~ls of our 
attitude here ; it deleted them from the first part, but kept them 
In thc second It seems to me that the Rapporteurs ought to q 
~thairRqorttbat,inthae~~~~,tlaedocumentianot 
m-report. 
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